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INTRODUCTION

In 1994, South Africa emerged from under the rule of
an oppressive Apartheid state to embrace a new set of
principles and values guided by the ideal of
constitutionalism.3 The nation adopted a Constitution4
designed to propel the country from autocratic rule to a
democracy built on egalitarian values. In the spirit of
constitutionalism, the South African government’s powers
are exclusively drawn from the Constitution, and its roles
and responsibilities are continuously clarified through
judgments of the Constitutional Court (Court). Furthermore,
the norms articulated in the Constitution, which the South
African state has committed to uphold, are constantly given
content through judgments of the Court. Much like the state,
the Court’s primary interpretative anchor is the
Constitution.5 In fulfilling its role as the check on the
democratic institutions, it is bound exclusively by the
perimeters of the Constitution. The result of this remarkable
transition is that the Court is placed between the values
contained in the Constitution on the one hand, and the
values held by the population reflected through the prism of
the executive and parliament on the other. While this has

See generally, Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the
Interim Bill of Rights, 10 SOUTH AFRICAN J. ON HUM. RTS. 31 (1994).
4 S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
5 Id. at § 1.
3
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created a standard to which South Africa is held to, it also
serves to remind us of what we have still to achieve.
This paper seeks to deal with instances in which the
executive arm of the state fails to adhere to constitutional
norms and standards in the implementation of judicial
decisions. Several scholars have examined the Court’s role in
the newly formed constitutional democracy and the noncompliance by the executive with the Court’s judgments.
Theunis Roux, in attempting to explain the interaction
between the South African Constitutional Court and the
executive, has generously concluded that the Court’s
technique in coaxing the executive’s adherence to principles
elucidated in court judgments consists of a deft use of
pragmatism, as well as principle.6 In this way, he has argued
that the Court has attempted to protect and build its
independence from political control by maneuvering
through the political circumstances peculiar to South Africa
and thus ensuring that its judgments are perceived as
effective.7 Several other South African scholars have taken a
critical view of the Court’s reluctance to grant the values in
the Constitution their fullest meaning, opining that such
reluctance of the Court exemplifies the Court employing
avoidance strategies so as not to risk its institutional
independence by demanding too much of executive

THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE 87 (2013). Roux wrote with
specific reference to the period of the Constitutional Court that spanned
the first ten years of democracy in South Africa, from 1995 to 2005. At its
heart, Roux’s argues that the Court was able to build and protect its
institutional independence during its infancy by employing a strategy
across its judgments that involved alternating between producing
pragmatic and principled judgments.
7 Id. at 29.
6
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decision-making.8 They argue that the effect of the Court’s
approach is to water down the intended strength of rights
enshrined in the Constitution, thus depriving those in need
of substantive justice.9
What this paper will attempt to show is that,
regardless of how one perceives the Court’s strategy with
respect to the executive, there have been instances in which
the Court has developed a substantive interpretation of
constitutional principles, ordered that the executive adhere
to those principles, and the executive has not complied.
Assuming Roux’s paradigm of principle and pragmatism
reflects the strategy currently employed by the Court,
executive non-compliance may be seen merely as the Court
failing to rely on pragmatism where it would have been wise
to do so. This paper suggests that the Court’s approach
towards the executive, while relevant, is not the only factor
leading to non-compliance of state actors. Rather, there are
other dynamics that influence the extent to which the state
has adopted constitutional norms in its behavior.
In reflecting on the instances where a gap has
emerged between judgments produced by the courts when
interpreting the Constitution and decisions made by the
executive in carrying out its administrative duties, focus
must shift to the institutional dynamics that govern the
decision-making processes of the executive. In doing so, we
assume that the manifestation of the normative
commitments of the state are entirely dependent on the
behavior of what has been termed as “street-level

Brian Ray, Evictions, Aspirations and Avoidance, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 173,
219 (2013); see also David Bilchitz, Avoidance Remains Avoidance: Is it
Desirable in Socio-Economic Rights Cases?, 5 CONST. CT. REV. 297 (2013).
9 See Ray, supra note 8, at 175; see generally, Bilchitz, supra note 8.
8
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bureaucrats,”10 or bureaucrats that occupy positions at the
public-facing level of administrative bodies, such as police
officers, teachers, immigration officials, and recruitment
officials.
The question then becomes, what creates a gap
between judicial decisions, rooted in the Constitution, and
the actions of street-level bureaucrats? The answer to this
question is likely complex and multi-faceted. It should begin
with the fact that the necessity for bureaucratic leaders to
delegate functions to lower level officials carries with it a
degree of discretion when carrying out those functions. This
inherent discretionary power that accompanies such
delegation results in the potential for a gap between the
policies girded by constitutional values and the behavior of
those individuals on whom such policies rely for
implementation. We would postulate that at least two
important factors exist that guide the use of administrative
discretion and lead to the gap between what ordinary
citizens experience when engaging with state actors and the
ideal of how the law should be implemented as articulated
in court judgments.
The first factor is the divergence between
constitutional or legal norms and social norms. In making
the arguments that follow in this paper, we have taken the
term constitutional norms to represent those norms
embodied within the Constitution, otherwise recognized as
the rights and principles clearly articulated in the actual text
of that document. We define legal norms as those norms
created by the judiciary based on their understanding of the

10

See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS
ed. 2010).

OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (2d
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Constitution. Legal norms give substance and content to
constitutional norms. Finally, social norms are norms held
by groups within society and guide decision-making of
individuals within those groups. They consist of the
informal rules that each individual feels obligated to follow
and that are enforced through non-legal means that exist
within social groups.
As members of society, street-level bureaucrats carry
with them the social norms that exist in the communities or
social groupings from which they are drawn. Significant
literature detailing the value and effects of social norms in
guiding behavior suggests that despite the presence of
formal controls, such as rules and regulations, social norms
play a large role in influencing individual decision-making.11
As a result, the potential exists for street-level bureaucrats to
be guided by their social norms more tangibly than by the
formal rules that emanate from within their administrative
institutions, the Constitution, or the Court.
The second factor on which the implementation of
judicial decision-making is contingent is the process of
communication of those decisions by the judiciary to the
executive and within the executive itself. Poor
communication of legal norms ensures that they remain
ineffective. Even where judicial decisions seek to merely
express the existence of constitutional principles and do not
require specific action on the part of state actors, effective
communication is necessary for that expression to have any
impact on executive behavior.
In accurately describing the scope of this paper, it
may be important to briefly describe the subjects and

R OBERT C. E LLICKSON , O RDER W ITHOUT L AW : H OW N EIGHBORHOODS
S ETTLE D ISPUTES 137-155 (1991).
11
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arguments that may fall within the broader topic of a court’s
relationship with the executive and the public, but do not
fall within the aims of this paper and are thus not dealt with
in great detail. First, it may be argued that court judgments
have value as an expression of a legal norm.12 Judgments
make normative statements on the law which enter the arena
of public discourse. Such a legal norm can then, through
various mechanisms external to the direct links between the
court and the executive, have an impact on both executive
decision-making and the norms adopted by the public.13
Rather than enter this debate, this paper seeks to explain the
reasons for the instances in which the state, as the addressee
of a judgment, is unable (or unwilling) to comply with its
order. While the argument can be made that the executive
will eventually comply and that therefore legal norms will
animate administrative decision-making, such a belief does
not explain the reasons for the executive’s incapacity to
manifest such norms when first ordered to do so.
Second, the gap between judicial decision-making
and the executive branch’s enforcement can be explained as
the product of a country in the midst of a difficult
democratic transition. Much like any legal transplant or
constitutional borrowing, it simply takes time for norms and
standards to internalize and effectively guide behavior.14
While this may be true, this explanation fails to examine
more closely the particular dynamics that exist within the

Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2022 (1996); see generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998).
13 See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 577 (1993).
14 ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE
MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 117-126 (2006).
12
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executive which allow for a gap between constitutional or
legal norms and social norms to influence the
implementation of judicial decisions.15 More importantly,
the transitional democracy argument does not clarify how
the difference in norms manifests within the administrative
state.
The value of a deeper analysis of these dynamics as
opposed to simply relying on the notion of transitional
democracy is that such an understanding can be used to
target and remedy the disjuncture between constitutional
norms and executive action that prevent the realization of
constitutional goals and ultimately slow the process of
transition from Apartheid to the reality the Constitution
envisions.
Finally, we concede that non-compliance by
administrative agencies with judicial-decision making has
only, even if repeatedly, occurred in certain pockets of the
bureaucracy. It is not the intention of this paper to overstate
a decline in the courts’ legitimacy or to suggest that the
executive has adopted a general stance of defiance towards
judicial decisions. Rather, we hope merely to demonstrate
that an assurance of executive compliance with judicial
decision-making is subject to the pressure exerted by the

For examples of analysis and case law on the impact of a democratic
transition on the executive and its indifferent response to constitutional
norms, see S TEPHEN P ETE , B EHIND THE M ASK OF THE R AINBOW N ATION :
T HE L IMITS OF L AW IN P OST -A PARTHEID S OUTH A FRICA , IN N ATION B UILDING & T RANSFORMATION 169, 185-196 (Catherine Jenkins & Max
du Plessis eds. 2014); Clive Plasket, Administrative Justice and Social
Assistance, 120 SOUTH AFRICAN L. J. 494 (2003); David Dyzenhaus, The
Pasts and Future of the Rule of Law in South Africa, 124 SOUTH AFRICAN L. J.
734, 758 (2007); MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v. Kate 2006 (4)
SA 478 (SCA) at para. 5.
15
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social norms adopted by street-level bureaucrats, as well as
the methods of communicating constitutional norms
between all relevant institutions and individuals responsible
for norm creation and implementation.
Ultimately, the lack of acquiescence to judicial
decisions by certain branches of the executive serves as a
barrier to the courts’ ability to engage effectively in norm
creation. This in turn impacts access to justice for ordinary
citizens in a very tangible way when street-level bureaucrats,
who adhere to social norms not necessarily consistent with
the constitutional or legal norms, are tasked with decisions
intended to implement judicial decisions.
In the following section, we briefly outline examples
in which the executive has failed to comply with judicial
decisions, despite ample opportunity to do so. These
examples aim to demonstrate the way in which such noncompliance significantly impacts access to justice and the
subsequent need to develop strategies to remedy the
executive’s non-compliance. In Part III, we examine the
nature of the executive branch and its responses to judicial
decisions. Part IV discusses the importance of social norms
in guiding executive behavior, and Part V looks carefully at
the role of communication between the judiciary and the
executive in the effective implementation of judicial
decisions.
II.

COURT DECISIONS AND EXECUTIVE ACQUIESCENCE
A. ILLEGAL DETENTION AND DEPORTATION:
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

THE

Over the past five years, the Department of Home
Affairs (Department) has been notorious in its refusal to
comply with court judgments. In terms of the Immigration

94
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Act, the Department is tasked with upholding legislation
relating to foreigners, including illegal foreigners and
asylum seekers.16 The Immigration Act is one of the main
pieces of legislation governing the Department’s actions. The
Act allows for immigration officials to detain illegal
foreigners pending a determination of their status.17
However, a person may only remain in detention for more
than 48 hours if it has been determined that he or she is an
illegal foreigner and is being held pending deportation.18
Section 34(1) of the Act provides those declared to be illegal
foreigners with procedural safeguards during their
detention in order to protect them from unlawful
deportation, including the right to request an appeal and to
demand a warrant from the court for their detention.
In 2003, Lawyers for Human Rights challenged the
constitutionality of specific sections of a previous version of
the Immigration Act that gave wide discretion to
immigration officials to arrest, detain, and deport foreigners
without procedural protections.19 The High Court declared
these sections unconstitutional and this finding was upheld
by the Constitutional Court in Lawyers for Human Rights.20 In
that judgment, the Court confirmed the need for procedural
safeguards, as stipulated in Section 34(1) of the new
Immigration Act, and found that the absence of similar
safeguards in the challenged provision of the Act relating to
foreigners not yet in South Africa, but at a point of entry,

Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (S. Afr.).
Id. § 41.
18 Id. § 34.
19 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and
Another 2003 (8) BCLR 891 (T).
20 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and
Another 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) [hereinafter “Lawyers for Human Rights”].
16
17
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was unconstitutional.21 The Court makes clear that in order
to comply with Section 36 of the Constitution, which allows
for the limitation of rights under certain circumstances,
immigration officials must follow procedural safeguards that
protect the rights of foreigners attempting to gain entry into
the country.22 In so doing, the Court highlighted the
importance of the provisions contained in Section 34(1) of
the Immigration Act to the constitutionality of immigration
procedures.23
Despite the Court’s clear pronouncement on the
necessity of procedural safeguards, the Department has
repeatedly failed to comply with the procedures contained
in Section 34(1). In 2010, the Supreme Court of Appeal
(SCA)24 heard a case regarding the detention of an illegal
foreigner for a period exceeding 30 days without a court
warrant, which is one of the safeguards provided for in
Section 34(1).25 The SCA, citing Lawyers for Human Rights,
made clear the importance of the right not to be detained
any longer than necessary without a court warrant to justify
the detention.26
Two years later, the Department was brought before
the High Court for again, amongst other things, detaining a
foreigner for a period exceeding 30 days without obtaining a

Id. at para 43.
Id.
23 Id.
24 The Supreme Court of Appeal is the second highest court of appeal in
the country, after the Constitutional Court.
25 Immigration Act § 34(1). See Arse v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others
2010 (4) SA 544.
26 Id. at 552.
21
22
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court warrant justifying that extension.27 The detention was
found to be unlawful.
More recently, in August 2014, the Department was
again brought before the High Court, this time by the South
African Human Rights Commission, for lack of compliance
with Section 34(1) of the Immigration Act.28 Despite the fact
that the courts have repeatedly found that non-compliance
with
Section
34(1)’s
procedural
safeguards
is
unconstitutional, the Department attempted to justify its
actions by stating that it is impossible to detain foreigners for
less than 120 days pending deportation because foreign
embassies routinely fail to cooperate.29 No evidence was
presented to support this assertion.30 The Department
argued that under such circumstances, their officers should
be granted discretion to extend a foreigner’s detention where
reasonable or justifiable.31
In a scathing judgment, the High Court found the
detention practices of the Department unconstitutional and
highlighted the Department’s repeated disregard for judicial
decision-making:
[T]his Court and many other courts all over the
country, including the Supreme Court of
Appeal, have stated that detention of illegal
foreigners for more than 30 days and 120 days
without a valid warrant of arrest is unlawful
and unconstitutional. In spite of these judicial

Sikuola v. The Minister of Home Affairs [2012] ZAGPJCH 98.
Id. at para. 34.
29 See South African Human Rights Commission and 40 Others and the
Minister of Home Affairs: Naledi Pandor and 4 Others 2014 ZAGPJCH.
30 Id. at para. 36.
31 Id. at para. 40.
27
28
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pronouncements, the respondents still persist
in detaining illegal foreigners for more than 30
days and a maximum of 120 days without
valid warrants having been issued.32
The High Court proceeded to direct the Department
to provide the South African Human Rights Commission
with regular written reports on all foreign individuals
detained in their facilities to ensure compliance with the
legislation and court orders.33 Given the Department’s
failure to comply in the past, the Court concluded that “[a]n
order without continued monitoring and reporting will be
ineffective in vindicating the rights of detainees.”34
A similar pattern of non-compliance with judicial
decision-making exists in the Department’s deportation
practices. In 2001, the Constitutional Court held in
Mohamed35 that to deport an illegal foreigner to a country
where he or she will stand trial and face the death penalty is
a violation of that person’s constitutional right to life and
dignity unless assurances can be made by the foreign
country that the death penalty will not be imposed.36 In that
judgment, the Court made clear that to deport an individual
to a country where he or she may face the death penalty
“ignores the commitment implicit in the Constitution that
South Africa will not be party to the imposition of cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment.”37

Id. at para. 45.
Id. at para. 52.
34 Id. at para. 44.
35 Mohamed and Another v. President of the RSA and Others 2001 ZACC 18;
2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) [hereinafter “Mohamed”].
36 Id. at para. 60.
37 Id. at para. 58.
32
33
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In 2010, the High Court restated the principle
established in Mohamed when the Department again decided
to deport two foreign nationals who upon deportation
would face trial and possible execution.38 The Department,
despite the clear holding in Mohamed, defended it’s actions
and argued that because the foreign country in this case had
refused to provide assurances that the death penalty would
not be imposed, the Department had no choice but to deport
the illegal foreigner.39 In upholding the High Court’s
judgment, the Court reiterated its earlier holding, making
clear the principle that the government of South Africa may
not, under any circumstances or in any capacity, participate
in the imposition of the death penalty on any individual.40
A stark example of non-compliance with judicial
decision-making by the Department can be seen in a pair of
judgments handed down by Judge Davis of the Western
Cape High Court.41 The case concerned the deportation of an
Uzbek national, Ms. Mukhamadiva, who arrived at the Cape
Town International Airport with a valid visa.42 Ms.

Tsebe and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Pitsoe v.
Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2012 (1) BCLR 77 (GSJ) at para. 87.
39 Id. at para. 89.
40 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v. Tsebe and Others 2012 ZACC 16;
2012 (5) SA 467 (CC). This is a particularly interesting example, as Roux
relied on the Court’s judgment in Makwanyane abolishing the death
penalty as an example of successful acquiescence by the executive in the
face of overwhelming public opposition. It is interesting to note then that
the norm failed to animate the executive’s decision making in both
Mohamed and Tsebe.
41 Mukhamadiva v. Director General of Home Affairs and Another 2011
ZAWCHC 483 [hereinafter “Mukhamadiva I”]; Mukhamadiva v. Director
General Department of Home Affairs and Another 2012 ZAWCHC 337
[hereinafter “Mukhamadiva II”].
42 Mukhamadiva I at para. 1-2.
38
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Mukhamadiva was deported before an investigation could
be conducted into the legality of her presence in South
Africa, despite the fact that a court order had been issued
instructing the Department officials to appear in court the
following day to show cause for why Ms. Mukhamadiva
should not be permitted to enter the country.43 The Chief
Immigration Officer at the Cape Town Airport, Mr. Hans
Grobbler, received the court order, but was instructed by his
superior not to comply.44 Mr. Grobbler insisted on noncompliance with the court order and refused to speak to the
Judge who had issued the order over the phone when asked
to do so.45 Ms. Mukhamadiva was returned to her home
country without a hearing and in violation of the court
order.46
The issue that was subsequently heard by the High
Court was whether or not Mr. Grobbler acted in contempt of
court by refusing to comply with the court order.47 During
the proceedings, two reasons for Mr. Grobbler’s noncompliance were highlighted by the parties. First, he was
told by a superior that an order citing only the Director
General and the Minister of Home Affairs prevented an
immigration officer, like Mr. Grobbler, from obeying that
order.48 Second, the Head of Immigration for the Western
Cape was on record stating that court orders must be served
on Parliament leading to Mr. Grobbler’s misunderstanding
as to the nature of court orders and their implementation.49

Id. at paras. 4-5.
Id. at para. 6.
45 Id. at paras. 6-7.
46 Id. at paras. 4-5, 9.
47 Id. at para. 9.
48 Mukhamadiva I at para. 11.
49 Id. at para. 12.
43
44
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Mr. Grobbler’s reaction to a court order stems from a
much larger issue of procedure and compliance with judicial
decision-making by the Department. His refusal to speak to
a judge over the phone further demonstrates “a clear
breakdown between the department and court.”50 Thus,
while the Court found that Mr. Grobbler was not in
contempt of court, it noted what appeared to be a “serious
lack of education that immigration officials require in order
to deal with these difficult questions which could allow
them to implement the law and safeguard legal rights.”51
In light of clear misinformation circulating within the
Department of Home Affairs, Judge Davis proceeded to
order the Head of Immigration for the Western Cape to
submit a report detailing current procedures, followed by
officials served with an urgent order and whether a plan
would be adopted to educate immigration officials in how to
comply with court orders.52
The report that was subsequently submitted to the
Court revealed that the Department’s procedures had been
based on a misinterpretation of international law.53 This
misunderstanding led to the conclusion that immigration
officials have no authority in an international airport.54 In an
advisory judgment, Davis concluded that the report and the
Department’s procedures are “manifestly flawed” and
cannot, under either international law or the Constitution,
“justify the approach to the enforcement of court orders”
adopted by the Department.55 He makes the judgment

Id. at para. 13.
Id. at para. 12.
52 Id. at para. 14.
53 Id. at para. 9.
54 Mukhamadiva I at paras. 8-9.
55 Id. at para. 20.
50
51
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available to the Department with the objective that adequate
policy “reflecting the Department’s commitment to the
Constitution and the rule of law be followed in the future.”56
B. ATTITUDES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ACT AND COMPLIANCE
Domestic violence is a particularly complicated area
of law to regulate because of the private and intimate nature
of the crime. Domestic abuse occurs in the home and the
perpetrator is someone close to and often loved by the
victim. Because they are private, both the scene of the crime
and the relationship between victim and abuser are spaces
that are traditionally protected from state intervention. As a
result, domestic violence is often viewed as a family matter
and officials are often reluctant to intervene in that space to
turn what otherwise appears to be a civil matter into a
criminal one. The first piece of legislation designed to
combat domestic violence in South Africa, the Prevention of
Family Violence Act of 1993 (PFVA),57 reflected the view that
domestic violence is, at its core, a family issue in the
following explanation of its purpose: “The purpose of this
draft bill . . . is to make simpler, shorter and more effective
procedure possible. A new, more effective system may
contribute to a strategy to deal with domestic violence
outside the criminal courts in order to maintain family
unity.”58

Id. at para. 21.
Prevention of Family Violence Act 33 of 1993 (S. Afr.).
58 From the explanatory memorandum of the draft Bill, see Joanne Fedler,
Lawyering Domestic Violence Through the Prevention of Family Violence Act
56
57

102

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

It is clear from the above that the intention of the
PFVA was, to the extent possible, to keep domestic violence
outside of the criminal space. The priority was also to keep
families together. This view clearly misunderstands the
nature of domestic violence and the need to prioritize the
safety of abused women over all else, including family unity.
Research has shown that tactics like mediation and
counseling designed to bring a victim and batterer back
together are detrimental to the victim and very rarely reduce
levels of violence.59
In 1996, in light of concerns raised regarding the
PFVA, the South African Law Commission formed a
committee of feminist lawyers and experts in domestic
violence in order to make recommendations on amendments
to the PFVA.60 The product of this was the Domestic
Violence Act of 1998 (DVA), which, among other things,
expanded the definition of a domestic relationship, defined
specific acts of violence (including economic ones), and did
away with sheriff’s fees for service of court orders.61
Twelve days before the DVA came into force, the
Constitutional Court handed down judgment in a case
challenging the legality of provisions of the PFVA (and, by
extension, equivalent provisions of the DVA) that allow a
court to authorize a warrant of arrest when it issues a

1993—An Evaluation After a Year in Operation, 112 SOUTH AFRICAN L. J.
231, 237 (1995).
59 Id. at 238-9.
60 Lisa Vetten, Addressing domestic violence in South Africa: Reflections on
strategy and practice, expert paper for U.N. DIVISION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (May 2005), available at:
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp2005/docs/experts/vetten.vaw.pdf.
61 Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
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protective order but suspend that warrant on condition that
the protective order not be violated.62 Justice Sachs, writing
for the Court, refers to sections of the Constitution and
international treaty obligations that create a duty on the state
to deal effectively with domestic violence.63 Section 12(1)(c)
of the Constitution provides that everyone “has the right to
freedom and security of the person, which includes the right
to be free from all forms of violence from either public or
private sources.”64 Read with Section 7(2) of the
Constitution,65 Justice Sachs states, “section 12(1) has to be
understood as obliging the state directly to protect the right
of everyone to be free from private or domestic violence.”66
The Court, in emphasizing the duty of the state to
protect individuals from harm from private sources, makes
clear that the private nature of domestic violence cannot be
used to justify inaction by state actors. Earlier in the same
paragraph, Sachs writes:
All crime has harsh effects on society. What
distinguishes domestic violence is its hidden,
repetitive character and its immeasurable
ripple effects on our society and, in particular,
on our family life. It cuts across class, race,
culture and geography, and is all the more

The State v. Baloyi and Others 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) (S.Afr.).
Id. at paras. 11-13.
64 S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 12, cl. 2(c).
65 Id. ch. 2, § 7, cl. 2 (“The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfill
the rights in the Bill of Rights”).
66 Baloyi at para. 11.
62
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pernicious because it is so often concealed and
so frequently goes unpunished.67
Not only can the nature of domestic violence not be
used to justify inaction by the state, the Court goes on to
comment on the systemic problems of inaction:
The ineffectiveness of the criminal justice
system in addressing family violence
intensifies the subordination and helplessness
of the victims. The also sends an unmistakable
message to the whole of society that the daily
trauma of vast numbers of women counts for
little. The terrorization of the individual
victims is thus compounded by a sense that
domestic violence is inevitable. Patterns of
systemic sexist behaviour are normalized
rather than combatted.68
In its discussion of the constitutional principles
underlying domestic violence legislation, the Court clarifies
the substantive meaning of those constitutional rights and
the state’s subsequent obligation. In so doing, the Court
makes clear that the state has a duty to protect individuals’
rights to be free from private violence. Furthermore,
ineffective action by the State and the perpetuation of
systemic sexist behavior form part of the harm that the state
has a constitutional obligation to protect individuals from.
In 2005, the Court had an opportunity to reiterate the
principles set out in Baloyi in a nearly-identical challenge to

67
68

Id.
Id. at para. 12.
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the Domestic Violence Act, in Omar.69 Van der Westhuizen,
writing for the Court, states:
Whereas the privacy of the home and the
centrality attributed to intimate relations are
valued, privacy and intimacy often provide the
opportunity for violence and the justification
for non-interference . . . . It is understandable
for the legislature to enact measures that differ
from those generally applicable to criminal
arrests and prosecutions. It is clear that the Act
serves a very important social and legal
purpose.70
With these two judgments, the Constitutional Court
effectively removes domestic violence from the sphere of
private family matters, and places it squarely within the
ambit of the state’s obligation to uphold the Constitution.
This shift in the law’s treatment of domestic violence has
generally not been reflected in the behavior of street-level
bureaucrats, like police officers, tasked with upholding the
law.71
In a 2006 study in one locality in Mpumalanga, only
6.7% of cases of domestic violence that were reported to the
police, courts, or hospitals made it into official police
statistics as only 63 of these women pressed charges.72 While

Omar v. The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2006
(2) SA 289 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter “Omar”].
70 Id. at para 18.
71 Lisa Vetten, Domestic Violence in South Africa, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY
STUDIES, Policy Brief No. 71 (2014).
72 LISA VETTEN, TERESA LE, ALEXANDRA LEISEGANG & SARAH HAKEN, THE
RIGHT AND THE REAL: A SHADOW REPORT ANALYSING SELECTED
69
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this could simply be the result of women choosing not to
press criminal charges against their partners, a more recent
study in Gauteng found that only 8% of victims interviewed
were informed by the police that they could press criminal
charges against their abusers.73 The same study revealed that
victims were being encouraged to mediate with their
abusers, rather than have them arrested.74 Another study in
Mpumalanga found that in 14% of reported cases of
domestic violence, families were left to settle the matter
themselves, and in 14.5% the police simply warned the
perpetrator without taking further action.75
The above reports demonstrate a continued pattern
by the police of treating domestic violence as a family matter
that should be resolved privately without state intervention
and certainly without involvement of the criminal justice
system. One of the co-authors of this paper (Vance) interacts
with victims of domestic violence in her capacity as a legal
advisor at Lawyers Against Abuse, a non-profit organization

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1998 DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ACT AND 2007 SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 31 (Christi van der
Westhuizen ed., 2010) (citing Lisa Vetten et. al., “I Have a Problem”:
Women’s Help-Seeking in Acornhoek, Mpumalanga, TSHWARANANG LEGAL
ADVOCACY CENTRE, Research Brief No. 1 (2009)).
73 CLAUDIA LOPES, DIANNE MASSAWE & MPIWA MANGUIRO, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: ASSESSING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT IN GAUTENG 58
(Kailash
Bhana
ed.,
2013),
available
at
http://za.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2013/10/criminaljustic
eresponses-assessingimplimentationofdvaingauteng.pdf.
74 Id. at 5.
75 Lisa Vetten, Francoi van Jaarsveld, Phineas Riba & Lindiwe
Makhunga, Implementing the Domestic Violence Act in Acornhoek,
Mpumalanga, TSHWARANANG LEGAL ADVOCACY CENTRE, Research Brief
No. 2, at 3 (2009).

2015

EXECUTIVE ACQUIESCENCE

107

based in Johannesburg. Through her work, she has observed
a tendency on the part of state actors to shy away from legal
remedies to domestic violence. One woman, after having
been physically dragged and threatened by her partner,
recounted the following:
When the police arrived I informed them that I
wanted to leave the [perpetrator] and take my
children with me. The police responded by
saying that I should attempt to solve the
matter, and that I could leave, but because it
was already 4 a.m. it would be best if I let the
children stay with the [perpetrator] for the
remainder of the night and that I could return
later that day to fetch them.76
The police clearly failed to view the above situation as
one in which the woman was in severe danger for her life
and where a legal remedy would be appropriate. The fact
that the police suggested that the children should be left
with the abusive partner further demonstrates their
perception of this incident of violence as one that should not
prevent the victim from returning to co-habitate with her
abuser. Similar attitudes can be found with other street-level
bureaucrats charged with implementing the Domestic
Violence Act, such as prosecutors and magistrates.77 In one
instance, a prosecutor assigned to a case of domestic assault

Interview (Mar. 4, 2014).
Lisa Vetten, Addressing Domestic Violence in South Africa: Reflections on
Strategy and Practice, UN DIVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN,
Expert Group Meeting Paper prepared for “Violence Against Women:
Good Practices in Combating and Eliminating Violence against Women,”
at 10 (2005).
76
77
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leading to the near-death of the victim informed Vance that
he “felt sorry for the respondent” as it was “clear that he
only did what he did because he loves his wife” (the victim).
In another case, a magistrate sentenced a man accused of
assaulting his wife to a 5-year suspended sentence. His
reasoning for suspending the sentence was that this issue
should have been resolved by the respective families of the
parties and in his judgment he urged the families to come
together to create unity between the victim and abuser.78
C. HIV DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN
NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE
In 2001, the Court had occasion to make a definitive
pronouncement on the unconstitutionality of employment
discrimination against persons living with HIV.79 The South
African National Defense Force (SANDF) nevertheless had
adopted and continued to employ a complete ban on the
recruitment of people living with HIV.80 This policy was
challenged in 2008 in the High Court, which issued an order
directing SANDF to amend its hiring and recruitment
policies to comply with the Constitution. SANDF, in
accordance with the court order, amended its policies to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of HIV-positive status.81

These anecdotes are based on the personal experiences and notes of
one of the authors.
79 Hoffmann v. South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
80 S.A. Security Forces Union v. Surgeon General Case No. 18683/07 (2008)
at 1-2.
81 Id. at 4-6; South Africa’s Military Gets New HIV Policy, IRINNEWS (Jan. 26,
2010), available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/87879/south-africamilitary-gets-new-hiv-policy.
78
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On September 29, 2014, the High Court handed down
judgment in a case challenging SANDF’s continued practice
of discrimination against persons living with HIV.82 The
High Court found that, despite the new employment
policies, SANDF’s behavior was no different from the policy
that was declared unconstitutional six years earlier.83
SANDF’s justification for its behavior was that, over the six
years since the court order, it had been receiving an
overwhelming number of applications and was forced to
therefore create a system by which to eliminate potential
applicants.84 In defending its actions, SANDF asserted the
following: “It is submitted that there are circumstances
which justify the departure from the strict ipsissima verba of
the order and that the respondents were entitled to apply
their interpretation of the order, particularly in view of the
changed circumstances that have presented themselves.”85
The above statement demonstrates a fundamental
misunderstanding of the role of judicial decision-making
and its relationship to the functions of the executive arm of
government.
D. FAILURE TO INCORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
IN LAW-MAKING: THE CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENCE
In 2009, in a highly controversial move, the President
of South Africa signed into law legislation effectively
disbanding the Directorate of Special Operations (DPO), a

Andisiwe Dwenga and Others v. Surgeon-General of the South African
Military Health Service and Others 2014 ZAGPPHC 727 (GNP) (S. Afr.).
83 Id. at para. 8.
84 Id. at para. 10.
85 Id. at para. 14.
82
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specialized national crime-fighting unit, and replaced it with
the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI).86 In
2011, the Constitutional Court held in Glenister that the
newly established DPCI was not sufficiently independent to
pass constitutional muster.87 The Court suspended the
declaration of unconstitutionality for a period of 18 months
in order to give the executive the opportunity to remedy the
defect.88
The executive responded to the Court’s order with the
South African Police Service Amendment Act,89 which was
then challenged for non-compliance with the constitutional
requirement for independence as outlined by the Court in
Glenister.90 The case is currently before the Constitutional
Court on appeal from the High Court, which found some,
but not all, of the challenged provisions of the Amended Act
unconstitutional.91
There is nothing to suggest that in proposing the
Amendment Act, the government intentionally included
provisions that compromised the independence of the
judiciary. At best, what it does suggest is a failure to fully
understand the underlying principle of independence as
outlined by the Constitutional Court. There is no need, for
the purposes of this paper, to discuss each challenged
provision of the Amendment Act. However, to demonstrate

Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC)
at paras. 1-2 [hereinafter “Glenister”].
87 Id. at paras. 163, 248.
88 Id. at para. 251.
89 South African Police Service Amendment Act 10 of 2012 (S. Afr.).
90 Helen Suzman Foundation v. President of the Republic of South Africa and
Others; In Re: Glenister v. President of South Africa and Others 2014 (1) All
SA 671 (WCC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter “Helen Suzman Foundation”].
91 Id. at para. 123.
86
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the dissonance between the Court’s initial ruling and the
executive’s implementation of that holding, an example is
illustrative.
In Glenister, the Court listed aspects of the laws
governing the DPCI that compromised its independence.92
Amongst those was the lack of employment security. “[T]he
members of the new Directorate enjoy no specially
entrenched employment security . . . . In our view, adequate
independence requires special measures entrenching their
employment security to enable them to carry out their duties
vigorously.”93
The DSO, unlike the new specialized unit, was
governed by laws that provided for special removal
procedures for their members, which in turn provided
special protection that “served to reduce the possibility that
an individual member could be threatened—or could feel
threatened—with removal for failing to yield to pressure in a
politically unpopular investigation or prosecution.”94 The
clear underlying purpose of these protections is to minimize
the possibility that a member of the unit could be
compromised, thereby impacting the integrity and efficacy
of the entire office.
The Amendment Act uses language from the
judgment but, according to the High Court, fails to meet the
intent expressed therein.95 In Glenister, the Court uses the
DSO legislation to demonstrate employment security, citing
a provision, which states that a deputy may be removed
from office only by the President, “on grounds of

Glenister, at paras. 218-222.
Id. at para. 222.
94 Id. at para. 226.
95 Helen Suzman Foundation, at paras. 68-72.
92
93
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misconduct, continued ill-health or incapacity, or if he or she
is no longer a fit and proper person to hold the office.”96
Section 17DA(2)(a) of the Amendment Act lists verbatim the
above grounds on which a Head or Deputy Head of the
DPCI can be suspended or removed from office.97 However,
the following subsections allow for the Minister to suspend a
Head or Deputy Head without a hearing and without pay.98
The use of exact language in the Amendment Act
suggests that the Executive referred to Glenister in drafting
the new laws but failed to realize the underlying intent of
the Court to ensure independence of a specialized anticorruption unit. The result, whether intentional or not on the
part of the executive, is to undermine the Court’s
authoritative legitimacy when a clear order and judgment of
the Court fails to be incorporated into the government’s
decision-making, which in turn impedes the ability of
judicial decision-making to create substantial impact on the
country’s structures and laws.
III.

EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL NORM CREATION

The above examples clearly illustrate a divide
between the judiciary’s construction of constitutional
principles and decisions of the administrative state.
Presently, the South African judiciary has remained
independent and has not been subjected to overt and
aggressive attacks. However, as Roux rightly suggests, a
court’s institutional independence is composed of more than

Glenister, at para. 225.
South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, § 17DA(2)(a).
98 Id. at §§ 17DA(2)(a)-(e).
96
97
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just the absence of direct attacks from the executive.99 The
effective carrying out of the judiciary’s role in ensuring that
all branches of government are held to the prescripts of the
Constitution is also contingent on acquiescence to its
judgments. The examples above demonstrate that the
approach the judiciary has adopted to build and protect its
independence, while perhaps successful in avoiding direct
attacks, has not necessarily led to acquiescence of the
executive. Simply put, if the executive simply ignores or
only half-heartedly implements court judgments, this
undermines institutional independence, or at best renders it,
and the Court, less relevant, regardless of whether an overt
attack on the court has been made.
To fully understand the way in which judicial
decisions are incorporated into the work of the executive, it
is important to recognize that the executive is highly
complex.100 It is made up of diverse activities that produce a
multiplicity of decisions before a final decision is made
which can be judicially reviewed. Likewise, there exist a
complex set of processes, activities, and dynamics that occur
in response to a judgment of a court. It is on these processes
and dynamics that the prospects for the accurate and faithful
implementation of a judicial decision rest.
Furthermore, judicial decisions can influence
executive decision-making both directly and indirectly. They
may do so directly through a clear court order targeting the
behavior of a particular public body or actor. A decision may
also indirectly influence executive behavior through the
legal norms that emerge from a judgment. Any form of

ROUX, supra note 6, at 87.
SIMON HALLIDAY, JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (2004).
99
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judicial decision-making directed at public actors, whether
constitutional or administrative, deals with a particular
administrative, executive, or parliamentary act or decision.
Despite this particularity, through stare decisis and the
formulation of objective principles and norms, judicial
decisions typically aim to affect future decision-making of
whichever public body is the subject of the judgment, as well
as act as a repository of principle and legal norms from
which all public bodies should draw in order to guide their
behavior and decision-making.101 These values are part of
the courts’ process of norm creation and should then
permeate all executive decision-making.102
Public bodies or actors to which judgments are
directed can be categorized as either senior-level executives
or street-level bureaucrats.103 This is predicated on the
Weberian conception of bureaucracy in which the
bureaucracy is divided into individual decision-makers, who
are situated at different levels of a hierarchy.104 However, we
depart from the classic Weberian conception in that
directives issued from one level of the hierarchy to the next

H. Campbell Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 THE AMERICAN L.
REG. 745 (1886).
102 Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, social rights, and liberal political
justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13, 13-14 (2003).
103 This same distinction is alluded to in Bradley C. Canon, Studying
Bureaucratic Implementation of Judicial Policies in The United States:
Conceptual and Methodological Approaches, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 76, 80 (Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday ed. 2004).
104 See generally FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 196-204 (H.
H. Gerth & C. W. Mills ed. 1946); see also Terry M. Moe, The New
Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 739-746 (1984).
101
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are not necessarily carried out accurately and faithfully,105 as
evidenced by the examples in Section II.
Within this model, the specific category of
bureaucratic
decision-makers
responsible
for
the
implementation of executive policy is street-level
bureaucrats.106 These include decision-makers in public
institutions, such as schools, police, welfare departments,
environmental agencies and various other administrative
agencies, as well as government departments. Lipsky argues
that the public policy that is developed by senior members
of the executive or parliament is typically different from that
which is experienced by the public when engaging with
street-level bureaucrats tasked with implementing that
policy.107
Therefore, if bureaucracies are, to a certain extent, “at
the mercy of lower participants,”108 what factors actually
guide decision-making of street-level bureaucrats? What
reference points are used when interpreting the directives
issued by their superiors and the legislation that governs
their operation?
Disagreement over a policy or the interpretation of
governing legislation is one clear factor that guides the
decision-making of street-level bureaucrats.109 It is easy to
imagine that disagreement with the formal constraints that
they face in the form of policy prescriptions would

See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 104, at 196204.
106 LIPSKY, supra note 10, at 25.
107 Id. at 17.
108 David Mechanic, Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex
Organizations, 7 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 349, 351 (1962).
109 See LIPSKY, supra note 10, at 16.
105
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contribute to a less than whole-hearted compliance with
those policies.
Another factor is the need to develop coping
mechanisms.110 At the core of Lipsky’s argument is the
assertion that the inherent circumstances of the tasks faced
by street-level bureaucrats give rise to pragmatic solutions
that often deviate from stated policy, rules, and regulations,
and are tacitly accepted by their seniors as a necessity to
ensure that a task is completed.111 These coping mechanisms
are the responses that street-level bureaucrats develop to
deal with challenges that result from inadequate resources,
few controls, indeterminate objectives, and discouraging
circumstances.112 Given this complexity and variety in the
circumstances in which street-level bureaucrats are required
to operate, Lipsky concludes that prescribed responses are
not only inappropriate but impossible, which means that
discretion is inevitable.113 These coping mechanisms
manifest in three forms: the use of routines and stereotyping,
the modification of the scope of their duty in order to bridge
the gap between objectives and resources, and the
modification of perceptions of clients to bridge the gap
between objectives and accomplishments.114

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
112 Id. at 82.
113 For more recent descriptions of the discretion available to street-level
bureaucrats, see generally Tony Evans & John Harris, Street Level
Bureaucracy, Social Work and the (Exaggerated) Death of Discretion, 34 BR. J.
SOC. WORK 871, 872-880 (2004); Ian Taylor & Josie Kelly, Professionals,
Discretion and Public Sector Reform in UK: Revisiting Lipsky, 19 INT’L J. PUB.
SECTOR MGMT. 629, 629-640 (2006).
114 LIPSKY, supra note 10, at 82-83.
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Within the discretionary space afforded to street-level
bureaucrats, there exists a complex mesh of incentives and
norms that influence the manner in which decisions at this
level are made, including decisions regarding the
construction of coping mechanisms. On the one hand, as
agents of their superiors, street-level bureaucrats are subject
to certain mechanisms designed to align their incentives
with those of their superiors. On the other hand, street-level
bureaucrats are subject to their own normative assumptions.
In cases where the social norms held by street-level
bureaucrats diverge from the legal norms underlying policy,
these assumptions and prejudices are more likely to manifest
themselves in the decisions taken. For instance, a xenophobic
state actor tasked with the granting of asylum to foreigners
may be more likely to deviate from policies related to the
treatment of asylum seekers than if his views aligned with
the legal norms underlying those policies. Similarly, a police
officer investigating an incident of domestic violence, who
believes that male dominance in the home is the norm, may
allow this belief to influence his decision-making and
perhaps lead to a less than thorough investigation.
Given that the street-level bureaucrats are not
political appointees and need not display political fealty to
any particular ideology, their norms most likely
proportionately reflect those of a large portion of society.115

We suggest that the relevant norms in question are homophobia,
sexism, racism, xenophobia, and persistent stigmas regarding
HIV/AIDS. See CATHY ALBERTYN, RIGHTS AT WORK: THE TRANSITION TO
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA, IN NATIONBUILDING & TRANSFORMATION 91, 103-112 (Catherine Jenkins & Max du
Plessis ed. 2014) (a historical account of patriarchy that was embedded in
South African culture and tradition and its persistence despite legal
interventions); see also D. Skinner & S. Mfecane, Stigma, Discrimination
115
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As mentioned above, the increased and inevitable discretion
that breeds the various coping mechanisms used by streetlevel bureaucrats allows for these coping mechanisms to, in
part, be shaped by the social norms that guide their
behavior. As a result, what becomes relevant are the set of
norms that society has adopted. If societal norms reflected
principles such as equality of the sexes and the eradication of
prejudice, it is safe to assume that instances of inequality
would be reduced.116 Similarly, if street-level bureaucrats
internalized these same principles, instances of inequality or
injustice arising from their decisions and behavior would be
reduced.117
Take, for example, the decision of SANDF to employ
discriminatory hiring practices in the face of a clear directive
by the court to refrain from such discrimination. In that case,
SANDF identified in its arguments a challenge to its
function, namely, an overwhelming number of applications

and the Implications for People Living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa, 1 J. OF
SOC. ASPECTS OF HIV/AIDS 157 (2004); see also JONATHAN CRUSH,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE DARK SIDE OF DEMOCRACY: MIGRATION,
XENOPHOBIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 103 (2001); Carol
Adjai & Gabriella Lazaridis, Migration, Xenophobia, and New Racism in
Post-Apartheid South Africa, 1 INT’L J. OF SOC. SCI.. STUD. 192 (2013).
116 See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 11-28, 99-124 (1995); see also generally Susan M. Okin, A clash of
basic rights? Women’s Human Rights, Identity Formation and Cultural
Difference (1995) (unpublished manuscript).
117 This argument has been made in the context of judicial decisionmaking. See Timothy E. Lin, Social Norms and Judicial Decision-making:
Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-sex adoption cases, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 739 (1999). In the administrative context, see Simon Halliday,
Institutional Racism in Bureaucratic Decision-Making: A Case Study in the
Administration of Homelessness Law, 27 J. L. & SOC. 449 (2000).
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for employment.118 Its reaction to this challenge was to
develop a coping mechanism: the practice of discriminating
against persons with HIV in hiring. It perceived the court
order as subject to deviation in order to justify its
behavior.119 SANDF’s actions clearly demonstrate the impact
on access to justice of a divergence between judicially
created norms and social norms on the treatment of persons
living with HIV.
IV.

THE IMPORTANCE OF NORMS

Social norms play an important role in the decisionmaking of members of society, regardless of their
professional context.120 In other words, social norms
infiltrate the decision-making of all individuals to varying
degrees, regardless of the context in which the decisions are
made. Likewise, it has been argued that social norms may
operate so strongly that they can, at times, guide behavior at
the expense of applicable legal rules.121 This claim has been
made quite convincingly in the legal realist movement,122

Andisiwe Dwenga and Others, 2014 ZAGPPHC at para 10.
Id.
120 See Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
908 (1996); see also John Helliwell, Shun Wang & Jinwen Xu, How Durable
are Social Norms? Immigrant Trust and Generosity in 132 Countries, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 19855 (1981).
121 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Mike Aronson ed. 1991); see generally Eric
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996).
122 See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? – An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L. J. 704, 712–14 (1931); see also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 35 n.6 (Robert Stevens et al. eds.,1973).
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law and society literature,123 and organizational
economics.124 In fact, studies have shown an inverse
relationship between the enforcement of law and the social
norms that exist within a community.125 In other words,
where the law conflicts with social norms, the enforcement
of the law declines substantially.
One explanation for this phenomenon is that the
sanctions applied by a community on individuals that
deviate from a social norm, such as guilt or shame,126 are a
more effective motivational force for adherence than legal
sanctions or sanctions imposed by an entity external to the
community. These sanctions provide an enforcement
mechanism which results in a community’s negative
reaction to a transgressor’s actions.
The question is then what role social norms play in
guiding executive action in the implementation of judicial
decisions. In exploring this question, we do not attempt to
argue the extent to which judicial decisions can change
social norms. Rather, we simply accept that, with respect to
the social norms held by the broader public, the intention of
court judgments is to perform an expressive function.127 By
that we mean that judgments are statements on what is good

Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55, 62 n.7 (1963); see generally Mark H.
Van Pelt, Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing
Relationships, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 461 (1985).
124 Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, Social Norms and the
Enforcement of Laws (Aug. 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443427.
125 Id.
126 Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms,
with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369 (1999).
127 See Sunstein, supra note 120, at 903.
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and bad and through the articulation and promulgation of
these statements, courts attempt to influence existing norms
and behavior of those to whom a judgment is addressed. In
the context of this paper, the courts are addressing the
executive. As such, one should assume that an important
purpose of the judgment is to alter the behavior of the
executive. Thus, there is the potential for conflicts to arise
between the judgment and social norms held by the
bureaucrats to whom the judgment is addressed.
The judiciary is, through the mechanism of review
(whether constitutional or administrative), involved in the
process of constituting and propounding legal norms.
However, in using as its reference point a value-laden
constitution, these legal norms set a normative standard to
which both the state and society are called to comply with.
When courts are confronted with a review of government
action, whether directly with reference to a right enshrined
in the Bill of Rights, or indirectly through the mechanism of
administrative law, it is giving content to and creating a
legal norm. These legal norms then either stand in contrast
to or confirm social norms already held by all or a portion of
society.
The difficulty with the judiciary’s position is that the
values in the Constitution, which form the reference point
for all adjudication, are themselves contested concepts.
Principles such as “equality” and “dignity” can have varied
interpretations and a general consensus from all members of
society can be neither assumed nor expected.128 For example,

This point was famously made in W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested
Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y. 167 (1955-1956); the concept of
contested norms within society was explored in Robert M. Cover,
Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1983).
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and with reference to the cases discussed in Section II, the
essence of the meaning of gender equality that emerges in
Baloyi, the imperative to treat foreigners with dignity and
respect in Lawyers for Human Rights, and the importance of
carrying out governmental tasks free of favor and corruption
in Glenister, all find their roots in the Constitution. However,
the meaning of these norms varies widely across social
groupings. Given the normative plurality that emerges, it is
not difficult to imagine that a gap may emerge between the
manner in which courts understand these norms and the
manner in which these norms are interpreted in different
social groupings.
We would argue that social norms can translate
themselves into state action in two ways: a direct and an
indirect method. The direct method exists simply by product
of the fact that bureaucrats are members of society. Thus, the
sets of norms adopted by this community of bureaucrats
often proportionately represent those of the communities
from which the members are drawn. As a result, where
judicially-created norms conflict with societal norms, they
often also conflict with norms directing the behavior of
street-level bureaucrats.
The important question is, therefore, what explains
the instances in which bureaucrats are not effectively
constrained by laws or court judgments? The answer, under
the direct method, has been persuasively argued by Lipsky:
street-level bureaucrats constitute a community and are
strongly influenced by the norms prevalent in that
community, often more than they are influenced by those
created by the judiciary.129 In fact, the process of social
norms manifesting themselves as cognitive tools, such as

129
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stereotyping through which people perceive and understand
the world around them, can be so insidious that it often
occurs without our awareness.130 In this way, discriminatory
beliefs and ideas are absorbed unconsciously by individuals
who find themselves in bureaucratic positions wielding
discretion in the making of administrative decisions.131
A useful example of the relative inadequacy of
external controls of street-level bureaucrats is Somali
Association.132 The South African Police Service (SAPS) in
Limpopo initiated a policy called “Operation Hardstick” to
close businesses in Limpopo that were operating without
requisite permits.133 In carrying out the SAPS policy,
policemen closed 600 businesses, many with valid licenses,
confiscated equipment and stock, and arrested traders and
their employees.134 The policemen further told traders that
foreigners are not permitted to operate businesses in South
Africa and that the foreigners, who were predominantly
Somali and Ethiopian traders, should leave the
municipality.135 The SCA described instances of xenophobic
pressure being exerted by local business forums before this
policy was adopted, which ostensibly contributed to the
manner in which the police carried out the policy.136 These

Id. at 115.
For an articulation of the notion of the unconscious adoption of
discriminatory beliefs, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and the
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).
132 Somali Assoc. of S. Afr. v. Limpopo Dep’t of Econ. Dev., Env’t. and Tourism
2014 (143) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
133 Id. at para. 4.
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135 Id. at para. 4.
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actions were taken despite the fact that the policy’s objective
was the removal of unlicensed businesses and many of the
businesses targeted possessed valid licenses.137
As a final example, in Baloyi and Omar, the Court
effectively removed domestic violence from the sphere of
private family matters and placed it squarely within the
ambit of the state’s obligation to uphold the Constitution.138
In so doing, the Court created legal norms regarding
perceptions of victims of domestic violence and appropriate
responses to violence in the home. As displayed above, the
legal norms created by the Court have had little impact on
the behavior of street-level bureaucrats, like police officers,
in their treatment of victims of domestic violence.
In some ways, the tension between social and legal
norms and its impact on the effective implementation of
judicial decisions in South Africa can be analogized to the
circumstances under which international law, and
particularly international human rights law, operates. The
perpetual concern with international law is the need to
create incentives for states to comply with international
norms in the absence of any mechanisms designed to coerce
or enforce compliance. One argument pioneered by Harold
Koh is that a lack of compliance may partly, or wholly, be
based on the divide between international law norms and
the domestic norms (social, legal, or constitutional) that exist
in the recalcitrant state.139 Quite simply, when such norms
diverge, international law becomes less effective in guiding

Id. at para. 19.
Baloyi, at para. 11; Omar, at para. 18.
139 Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999)
137
138

2015

EXECUTIVE ACQUIESCENCE

125

state behavior.140 Koh then posits that greater compliance
could be achieved if international norms were better
internalized within the state.141
Turning back to South Africa, where effective police
enforcement is influenced by social norms adopted by police
officers, a similar internalization of legal and constitutional
norms would lead to better compliance with judicial
decisions. This is not to say that all street-level bureaucrats
must come to agree with the substance of legal norms.
Rather, they must internalize the necessity of compliance
with these legal norms, even when they conflict with social
norms.
The indirect method is through the political pressure
created by groups in society that reflect social norms and
wish to have those norms manifested in administrative
decision-making. The state’s need to respond to those
groups is obviously contingent on the political power
wielded by the groups. When such norms are held by a
politically powerful bloc, they may become more influential
than social norms held by society more generally because of
the clear intent of these groups to impact government
behavior. Where a divergence exists between social norms
and the behavior of the bureaucracy, political pressure
should in theory encourage government compliance with
social norms. While the purpose of this paper is not to
engage too deeply in what is the much larger and welltraversed subject of aligning government interests with

Id.
Id.; see also Charles K. Whitehead, What’s your sign? – International
Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 703 (2005-2006);
see also ANDRE T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 9 (Dedi Feldman et al. ed. 2008).
140
141

126

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

social norms, it is sufficient to rely on the notion of
democratic constitutionalism, which encapsulates the
application of such political pressure. Through various nonlegal means, social groups seek to influence the content of
constitutional law and in this way translate political power
into executive action.142 This indirect process of norms
percolating upwards from social groups is, however, not the
focus of this paper because it requires the existence of a
mobilized and active citizenry in order to present a
sufficiently powerful and recognizable political bloc. In the
normative issues that arise in the examples presented in
Section II, there is no clear evidence of any such political
movement to which the executive was responding. More
relevant to these particular examples is the direct manner in
which norms infiltrate administrative decision-making
through the actions of street-level bureaucrats.
It is important to note that the ability of social norms
to negatively impact the implementation of court judgments
does not suggest that those judgments are therefore without
value. There is inherent value in the expression of a higher
standard to which the Constitution expects individuals in
society and the state to behave. Such expressions enter the
arena of public thought and are important features of a
social discourse that plays a role in the transformation of
society. However, this should not detract from the need for
court judgments to be effective. In order to understand how
court judgments can be ineffective, one needs to understand

For a detailed expression of the notion of democratic
constitutionalism, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).
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the role that social norms play in the executive decisionmaking process.
It is important to acknowledge that social norms are
not determinative of how executive decisions are made.
Their influence depends in large part on the level of
discretion an individual street-level bureaucrat has in his or
her decision-making. Poor implementation of legal norms
may also be a function of the manner in which judicial
decisions are communicated from the courts to street-level
bureaucrats. Therefore, a closer look at the interactions
between the judiciary and the executive, and between higher
and lower level executives, is relevant to any discussion of
the effect of judicial decision-making on the executive and
will be explored in the next section.
V.

INTERACTION BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS

It is important to understand the process of executive
decision-making in order to identify possible reasons why
judicially-constructed norms do not filter down to affect the
behavior of street-level bureaucrats. While there has been
limited research in this area,143 efforts have been made to
describe, in theory, the path that judicial norms take within
the executive. Hertogh144 and Canon145 have each created
similar models of administrative decision-making that are
instructive. Our description below relies primarily on
Hertogh’s model. That model describes the process of

See generally KEITH HAWKINS, LAW AS A LAST RESORT: PROSECUTION
DECISION-MAKING IN A REGULATORY AGENCY (2003).
144 Marc Hertogh, Coercion, Cooperation, and Control: Understanding the
Policy Impact of Administrative Courts and the Ombudsman in the
Netherlands, 23 L. & POL’Y. 47 (2001).
145 Canon, supra note 103, at 80 n.16.
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administrative decision-making in three phases: information,
transformation, and processing. In our view, these phases are
all subject to the manner in which each institution and level
within the executive communicates with one another.
A. INFORMATION
The information phase is the process of relevant
individuals within the government, most often senior-level
executives, coming to understand the content of a judicial
decision.146 This involves interpretation and extraction of
principles and guidance or orders from the judgment.147 This
process ranges in complexity. On the one hand, the
department to whom the judgment is addressed will likely
need only to understand and follow the order of the court
without interrogating in great detail the court’s reasoning.
On the other hand, state actors whose duties fall within the
ambit of a judgment, but are not directly cited in the legal
proceeding that gave rise to the matter, will have to
extrapolate a general principle from the reasoning in the
judgment and apply it to the distinct context in which they
find themselves. This may be a decidedly more complex
task.
In this respect it is important to understand the role of
the form of communication between the two arms of
government. As mentioned above, this communication takes
place primarily by means of a judgment. As a result, if the
judgment is poorly written, reasoned, or difficult to
comprehend, the manner in which it is implemented by
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senior-level executives tasked with understanding it will
vary.148
B. TRANSFORMATION
Once senior-level executives believe that a judgment
calls for behavioral change, they must decide what change
should take place.149 This then forms a crucial stage for
determining the judgment’s impact. The impact of a judicial
decision is arguably hampered by the degree to which the
status quo is entrenched within the bureaucracy. If executive
decision-makers are overly attached to the current norms,
they may prove reluctant to change behaviors or procedures
to better align with legal norms constructed by a court. It is
this desire to maintain the status quo that may explain the
executive’s tendency to appeal decisions of lower courts
requiring a change in behavior, as was done by the
Department of Home Affairs in the context of detention and
deportation procedures.
A reason for the executive’s attachment to the status
quo could be the desire to avoid the costs involved in
altering administrative behavior. Other reasons could be that
a judgment forces a divergence from the agency’s primary
objectives or limits the domain over which the agency may
exercise power.
Another possibility is that an agency may disagree
with a court’s interpretation of its empowering statute.

See generally ANTONY N. ALLOTT, THE LIMITS OF LAW (1980); RICHARD
M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE (1967); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT
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Given the agency’s expertise on the subject-matter of its
work, a doctrine of deference with respect to agencies’
interpretation of the law, much like that found in the United
States, could prove useful in mediating conflicting
interpretations.150 In creating a mechanism which would
limit opportunities for the judiciary and agencies to
explicitly disagree on the interpretation of the law, agencies
would be permitted to make reasonable decisions.
Unfortunately, South African jurisprudence has yet to
develop a rigorous doctrine comparable to Chevron.151
However, even where agencies are afforded deference, their
decisions must conform to the normative requirements of
the Constitution.152 As such, deference would be not able to
excuse the administrative decisions described in Section II.
C. PROCESSING
This stage involves the potential reactions from
within the agency to the proposed change in the
administrative process in order to conform with the
judgment.153 As mentioned above, a change in policy in
response to a court judgment will typically occur at senior
levels of the administrative agency as, for example, what
occurred in the developing of rules governing an anticorruption unit.154 However, as the directive containing the

Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Cora Hoexter, The Future of Judicial Review in South African
Administrative Law, 117 SOUTH AFRICAN L. J. 484 (2000); see generally CORA
HOEXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (2d ed. 2010).
152 Dennis Davis, To Defer and When? Administrative Law and Constitutional
Democracy, 23 ACTA JURIDICA 23 (2006).
153 See Hertogh, supra note 144, at 58.
154 See discussion infra § II.
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change in policy begins to move down the administrative
hierarchy, it may encounter resistance. SANDF’s failure to
comply with constitutional hiring policies created in
response to a court order is an example of resistance within
an agency to policies created by senior level executives. This
resistance manifests in defensive mechanisms through
which bureaucrats attempt to avoid the application of the
change. These mechanisms may include exploiting the
inability of the court to monitor implementation by
obscuring the decision-making process or creating and then
exploiting a technicality in the law that justifies the
avoidance.
The motivation to adopt these avoidance techniques,
especially at street-level, may be that bureaucrats have
become attached to the coping mechanisms that they have
developed and, even in the face of demands from their
superiors, may be reluctant to abandon those tools.
Alternatively, a failure in implementation of a judgment
may come as a result of a clash between legal norms and
existing societal norms.
D. COMMUNICATION
In our view, a central theme that runs through the
three processes above is communication. This is so prevalent
that the three phases become less distinct than initially
suggested. At the first level of communication, the court is
primarily communicating with the administrative agency,
the lower courts, and the general public. This
communication most often comes in the form of a judgment.
At the second level of communication, senior-level
executives communicate their interpretation of the court’s
judgment in the form of altered policies to street-level
bureaucrats. Here, the method of communication is typically

132

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

“soft law,” which includes rules, regulations, and guidelines
developed by senior-level executives.155 The effectiveness of
reception, understanding, and, to a large extent, compliance
rests on the quality of communication at each level.156
At the first level of communication, an example from
the Constitutional Court offers a compelling argument for
greater attention to clarity in the penning of judicial
reasoning. A lack of clarity in a judgment can provide a
recalcitrant state (or lower court judges) the opportunity to
justify non-acquiescence.157 In our view, a clear and
unambiguous judgment does as much to limit this likelihood
as it does to limit the possibility of confusion in good faith
efforts to abide by the ruling.
An example demonstrating the need for clarity in
judgments is Walele.158 The Constitutional Court’s majority
judgment in Walele held that a local authority cannot
approve building plans, even should they comply with the
requirements articulated in the legislation governing
buildings standards, unless it is satisfied that the proposed
building will not disfigure the area in which it is built or
“derogate the value” of surrounding property.159 The

L. Sossin, The Politics of Soft Law: How Judicial Decisions Influence
Bureaucratic Discretion, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT:
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 129 (Marc M.
Hertogh & Simon S. Halliday ed. 2004).
156 See D. S. VAN METER & C. E. VAN HORN, THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
PROCESS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL POLICIES
(presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Chicago 1974).
157 Lawrence Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions, An Organizational
Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86, 92 (1976).
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majority judgment of the SCA in True Motives disagreed
with the majority held view in Walele.160 When confronted
with the argument that Walele stood as precedent and
governed the facts in True Motives, the SCA argued that the
portion of the judgment in which the relevant passages
resided were obiter and therefore were not legally binding
for the purposes of True Motives.161 Furthermore, the SCA
argued that the relevant portions of the judgment were
wrong.162 A particularly telling remark by the SCA when
justifying its departure from Walele is that certain
paragraphs “of Walele [are], at best, ambiguous”163 and
“with respect, wrong.”164 In a recent judgment, the
Constitutional Court held predictably that the statements
made in Walele were not obiter and therefore constituted
binding precedent for all lower courts, including the SCA.165
Communication through judgments is also important
in ensuring that the judgment is implemented as intended at
the street-level. At the second level of communication, the
formal manifestations of this communication are rules,
regulations, and guidelines (hereinafter collectively referred
to as “rules”). However, given the inevitable existence of
discretion at the street-level, this raises the interesting
relationship between rules and discretion. The matter was

True Motives 84 (pty.) Ltd. v. Madhi and Others 2009 (4) SA 1 (CC) at
para. 35 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter “True Motives”].
161 Id. at paras. 100-106.
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dealt with by the Constitutional Court in Dawood,166 where
skepticism of wide and unregulated discretion was
expressed. As a solution to the presence of discretion, which
resulted in the violation of a constitutional right, the
Constitutional Court ordered that, when faced with wide
discretion, parliament must draft rules and guidelines that
better articulate the manner in which administrative
agencies should implement legislation.167
Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court neglected to
grapple with several issues. First, while the Court correctly
concedes that discretion will always be present,168 it appears
to assume a rather simple relationship between rules and
discretion. The judgment defines this relationship as that
between two inversely correlated factors. Therefore, the
more there is of one, the less there is of the other. Rules,
however, are complex instruments and their impact on
discretion is often unknown. It is difficult, and some would
argue impossible, to predict how bureaucrats will react to
rules or what consequences may result from the
promulgation of rules. In order to deal with this reality,
jurisdictions such as the United States have created rigorous
rule-making procedures169 and agencies for the review of
proposed rules.170 Again, these steps have not been taken to
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the same extent in South Africa.171 Ultimately, without the
necessary processes to assess and revise, rules may be
counterproductive to efficient decision-making by streetlevel bureaucrats.172
Second, Dawood assumes that parliament is the best
entity for the development of rules.173 Typically, arguments
relating to the effective operation of administrative agencies
suggest that the agency itself should formulate rules or
guidelines that govern its own operation.174 While this may
be true in theory, this position could potentially create a
rather absurd result in the instances illustrated in Section II.
If agency leaders are provided with the opportunity to create
rules based on their understanding of a court judgment and
that understanding could be mistaken or be guided by extralegal concerns, the rules that would emanate from that
agency would themselves fail to accord with legal norms.
Ultimately, the adequate implementation of the judgment
still rests on the understanding and acceptance of the
judgment by the agency leaders. However, what agency
rules would provide is a clear signal of what the agency
understands the legal and constitutional norms to be. Such
rules provide the opportunity to test such understandings
through judicial review and correct any flaws that may exist.
Nevertheless, as illustrated above, this is not a complete
solution. Decisions of street-level bureaucrats may be
impervious to any formal constraint, including agency rules.
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It is important to note that understanding the
transmission of legal norms through the executive is
important in aiding good-faith efforts by bureaucrats to
abide by legal norms. If there is an overwhelming belief that
legal norms should be adhered to, despite social norms
personally held by individual executive decision-makers, an
understanding of the way in which decisions-makers discern
legal norms becomes valuable.175 However, institutional
dynamics only help to a point. When legal or constitutional
and social norms conflict sharply and there is no overriding
influence to abide by the legal or constitutional norm, then
the likelihood exists that social norms will dictate the
outcome of administrative decision-making.
VI.

CONCLUSION

South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to
democracy was carefully orchestrated to avoid further
conflict and oppression from the state. At the core of this
transition was the creation of a new Constitution and the
inauguration of a Constitutional Court specifically tasked
with its promotion and protection. Given the nation’s
history, the Constitution embodied more than rights and
principles, it strove to create a vision for a new South Africa;
one we recognize has not yet been achieved but that the
government has been tasked with developing. In the process
of creating this new South Africa, the courts continually
refine the nation’s understanding of our Constitution and
the appropriate implementation of its principles through
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norm.” See Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the
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their judgments and orders. Despite the careful thought and
great effort that has gone into the Constitution and
subsequent judicial decisions, the reality for many South
Africans remains divorced from the principles enshrined in
the Constitution.
In this paper we propose that a significant cause of
this rift is the behavior of street-level bureaucrats who,
acting with an inevitable degree of discretion, have the
power to make decisions that either remain faithful to
constitutional principles reflected in judicial decisions or
diverge from them substantially. We suggest that the
behavior of street-level bureaucrats can be better
understood, and hopefully corrected, through a careful
examination of two factors: the influence of social norms on
individuals, as well as the interactions between and within
government agencies. If legal norms hope to take precedence
over social norms in the behavior of street-level bureaucrats,
the gap between legal and social norms must be addressed.
The means with which to address this gap, whether by
influencing societal norms or creating stronger incentives to
comply with legal norms, is beyond the scope of this paper
and will likely vary across the country and subject matter.
This paper seeks to begin the process by identifying the sites
that require further study and from which we hope solutions
may emerge. With regard to interactions between
institutions, clarity in court judgments and the effective
transmission of such orders requires both clarity in the
judgments themselves and the development of effective
rules that can be judicially reviewed.
Though aspects of the vision of a new South Africa
remain unfulfilled, the foundation for higher standards of
conduct for both the government and society has been set
through the creation of a forward-looking Constitution.
Through careful reflection on our current reality and a
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willingness to change in order to move forward, significant
steps can be made towards achieving that vision.

